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The development of the property industry in and around Jakarta during the last decade was really
conspicuous. Various skyscrapers, shopping malls, luxurious housing estates, condominiums,
hotels and golf courses have significantly changed both the outlook and the spatial order of the
metropolitan area. Behind the development was the government's policy of deregulation, which
encouraged the active involvement of the private sector in urban development. The change was
accompanied by various consumptive trends such as the golf and cafe boom, shopping in gor-
geous shopping centers, and so on. The dominant values of ruling elites became extremely con-
sumptive, and this had a pervasive influence on general society. In line with this change, the
emergence of a middle class attracted the attention of many observers. The salient feature of
this new "middle class" was their consumptive lifestyle that parallels that of middle class as in
developed countries. Thus it was the various new consumer goods and services mentioned
above, and the new places of consumption that made their presence visible. After widespread
land speculation and enormous oversupply of property products, the property boom turned to
bust, leaving massive non-performing loans. Although the boom was not sustainable and it
largely alienated urban lower strata, the boom and resulting bust represented one of the most
dynamic aspect of the late New Order Indonesian society.
I Introduction
In 1998, Indonesia's "New Order" ended. Since then, we have witnessed drastic democratiza-
tion. Speaking of democratization, before the financial crisis in 1997, many observers had
discussed the potential power of the emerging Indonesian middle class in promoting democrati-
zation. They have been skeptical about its potential as a driving force of democracy because
the very prosperity of this emerging class was largely due to economic growth under the "New
Order" regime. Now, with the fall of the "New Order" and rapid democratization, were many
observers proven too pessimistic?
It is largely agreed that the "middle class" is a product of economic growth in the New
Order regime. If looked at from the level of income, this so-called "middle class" is not so
much "middle" as rather wealthy upper strata. Thus it is more convincing to call them the
"New Rich" [Robinson and Goodman 1996]. What has given them the outlook of a "middle"
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class was their consumptive lifestyle that is very similar to those of the middle class of mass-
consumptive societies.
For example, Kurasawa pointed out several characteristics of their style of consumption
[Kurasawa 1996: 100]. They spend much money on electronic products, Western-style hous-
ing, a varied diet, sports, good education, medical services and oversea travels. This class is
very conscious of maintaining prestige (gengsz) , which they express by shopping in luxurious
shopping centers, wearing expensive suits, riding in expensive cars, organizing extravagant
parties and so on. "In short, we can conclude that their culture is extremely extravagant and
exposed to foreign influence."
In another edition, Kurasawa points out the importance of "New Lower Middle Class" or
"Would-be Middle Class," the social strata situated just below the new middle class and featured
with clear upward orientation, keen attention to children's education and devote Islamic faith
[Kurasawa-Inomata 1999: 1]. Such suggestion provides interesting theoretical hypothesis and
would prompt further sociological studies.
But the purpose of this paper is not to identify a "middle class" as a specific social group
with some clear boundary. Their "middle class" outlook, their new lifestyle, was closely related
with the new products that they consumed and the facilities in which such consumption took
place, such as high class shopping centers, condominiums, housing complexes, fast food restau-
rants, etc.
In other words, it is largely these consumptive goods and facilities that have made the
Indonesian "middle class" something visible. We should, therefore, examine the factors which
have constituted this visibility. Who provides such new products and what kinds of power
were working behind that provision? The property industry has a crucial role in answering
such a question.
Indeed, the last decade was marked by an unprecedented cycle of boom and bust in prop-
erty industry, especially in the Jabotabek area Oakarta, and surrounding Bogor, Tangerang, and
Bekasi districts). Activities of developers have already created various housing and industrial
estates, office buildings, shopping centers, hotels and other resort facilities. As a result, the
landscape and spatial order of this area has substantially changed compared with that of a de-
cade ago.
In the following analysis, we thus do not directly argue about the middle class, but instead
make a tentative overview of the property boom and consumptive trends in the Jakarta metro-
politan area Oabotabek) during the last decade.
When we try to examine the issue of middle class in terms of the property boom, we find
that the impressive development of property industry itself was also looked at with skeptical
eyes in the theory of Ersatz capitalism.
In The Rise 0/ Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia, Yoshihara Kunio counts the develop-
ment of property industry as one of the features of "Ersatz capitalism" in ASEAN coun-
tries. According to him, the property sector, along with the trading and banking sector, is in
the tertiary sector and it is this tertiary sector that is most rapidly developing in ASEAN
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capitalism. But the tertiary sector in itself does not make a contribution to exports, thus it can-
not be a driving force of continuous advancement in national economic structure. In secondary
industry, namely the manufacturing industry, capitalists in ASEAN countries are usually heavily
dependent on foreign technology and in many cases are no more than comprador capitalists
who act as local agents for foreign producers. In other cases, they do not have export competi-
tiveness, thus they can only survive by protection and special facilities from the state. Thus,
they cannot be regarded as a dynamic actor in the national economy, but rather as a burden to
it, and this sector is dominated by rent seekers such as crony or bureaucratic capitalists and
speculators [Yoshihara 1988].
If looking from such a perspective, we get a disheartening implication about Indonesian
middle class: Ersatz capitalism had overgrown the property industry and this in turn contributed
to the emergence of something like a middle class, an Ersatz middle class. But many people,
including Indonesians, have criticized Yoshihara's view. For example, Arief Budiman criticizes
Yoshihara's theory, accusing him of treating the historical experiences of Western or Japanese
capitalists as an a-historical normative standard, and thus failing to take into account the differ-
ences in historical environment between Western, Japanese, and Southeast Asian capitalists
[Budiman 1990].
After all, it would be too naive to argue whether or not Indonesian capitalism and its prop-
erty industry is "true" or "authentic" while ignoring the fact that the very standard of authentic-
ity is contingent upon contesting forces in changing power relationships. When the New
Order government was still boasting of its shining economic achievements, the government
banned Yoshihara's book, blacklisted his name, and banned him to enter Indonesia. After the
economic crisis in 1997, the Indonesian government became under the severe conditionality
imposed by IMF. Many outside onlookers suddenly rode the bandwagon of Yoshihara, accus-
ing Indonesia of the "crony capitalism." Now, after the total collapse of the New Order regime,
it is too easy to brush away past property boom as a mere illusion. But it was one of the most
dynamic aspects of Indonesian society during the last decade and hence it is worth tracing
more closely what happened during the boom.
II The Age of Property Boom
1. The Economic Liberalization in Indonesia
In the 80s, Indonesia twice faced sharp decline in the oil price; first in 1983 and again in
1986. As a result, the revenue from oil exports declined to one-third from its peak level (from
US$19 billion in 1981-82 to US$6.9 billion in 1986-87). In addition to that, as a result of the
Plaza Accord in 1985, the Japanese yen sharply appreciated against the US dollar (by 55% in a
period of one year and five months). The Indonesian rupiah also experienced a 35% fall against
the yen within one year. This sharply increased the debt burden that the Indonesian govern-
ment owed to Japan. Because oil revenue and foreign debt were the two main revenue sources
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for the Indonesian government, these incidents severely curtailed the fiscal ability of the govern-
ment [Saidi 1998: 98-99]. To adjust the national economy to this new situation, the govern-
ment started a series of economic liberalization, deregulation and privatization policies.
2. Urbanization as a Challenge
During 1961-71, the population of Jakarta increased from 2.9 million to 4.5 million, an average
annual growth of 4.6%. During 1971-80, the growth continued at a rate of 3.9% per year, from
4.5 million to 6.5 million. In the middle of the 80s, the DKI Jakarta government made the Gen-
eral Plan of Spatial Arrangement 1985-2005. In a projection made at that time, the population
of Jakarta in the year 2000 would reach 16.5 million, making Jakarta the 10th most populous city
in the world. This projection had broad implications, Le. there needed to be a huge invest-
ment to create job opportunities, provide educational facilities, housing, transportation, food,
drinking water, electricity and so on. On housing for example, the Second Basic Development
Plan of DKI Jakarta (1985-2005) projected that the annual 4% growth of population would create
a need for 64,000 units of housing every year [Marbun 1988: 81-83].
With increasingly strained fiscal circumstances, it was unimaginable that government alone
could afford to provide all the necessary investment and thus the government came to regard
the involvement of private capital as an absolute necessity [Nirwhono & Hidayat 1986]. It was
in answering this challenge that the idea of large-scale urban development by private sector was
entertained seriously among the bureaucrats responsible for urban planning and housing
affairs. They hoped that mass production of housing and social infrastructure would be more
efficient than smaller-scale development. The economy of scale would guarantee developers
enough profit from the turnover of very profitable elements Oike luxury housing and commer-
cial facilities) even after they spend much for economically non-viable factors Oike basic infra-
structure and low-price housing), thus opening the way for the active role of the private sector
in providing basic urban infrastructure. The government hence came to desire a bigger role
for private sector in developing housing estates, industrial estates and urban renewal. Thus
Cosmas Batubara, the Minister of People's Housing Affairs of the Fourth Development Cabinet
(1983-88) encouraged the private sector to develop city-scale housing estates.
3. Pioneering Large-Scale Housing Projects
The idea of large scale housing development received a positive response from business circles
and thus gave birth to a few pioneering projects in Botabek (Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi dis-
tricts): firstly the BSD (Bumi Serpong Damai) in Tangerang and then Lippo Cikarang in Bekasi
followed by the Kota Legenda in Bekasi. But before touching upon it, let us make a brief over-
view of the development of private property industry under the New Order.
Since the early phase of the New Order, many private businesses made entry into the prop-
erty sector. But many of them just seek quick profit from speculative land transaction and not
so many entrepreneurs had showed continuous commitment to the sector. Ciputra and his
colleagues (such as Ismil Sofyan and Budi Brasali) are the most famous pioneers who estab-
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Iished property development as a professional occupation. An ethnic Chinese from Sulawesi,
Ciputra graduated the architect course of the Bandung Institute of Technology in the early
60s. Since the age of President Sukarno, he came to have close ties with DKl Jakarta govern-
ment and established his career with several pioneering projects such as Pasar Seneng build-
ings and Ancol Fantasyland. With the rise of Suharto, his business crony such as Sudono
Salim and Sudwikatmono also sought Ciputra's hand in expanding their emerging business
empire into the property sector. From the mid 70s, their joint company started developing
Pondok Indah, an extremely luxury housing estate in the southern part of Jakarta. This estate
became the most prestigious elite residential area in the New Order and has given pervasive
influence upon following residential estates.
Since the end of the 70s, President Suharto tried to build up a stronger supporting base
outside of the military, especially among the Muslim pribumi majority. He concentrated the
authority to allocate public expenditure under his closest subordinate, then State Secretary
Sudarmono. Before being liquidated in 1988, Sudarmono's Tim Sepeluh (Team 10) actively
allocated public-work projects to some well-connected pribumi entrepreneurs, such as Bakries,
Ponco Sutowo and Siswono Yudohusodo. From this new patronage structure emerged a new
generation of developers.
The emergence of the big professional developers in the 70s and 80s hence cannot be sepa-
rated from active supports from the government. But once having established themselves as a
big business, they came to play an increasingly independent role in the national economy.
Pondok Indah in the 70s was developed as an elite residential area within Jakarta. But
projects such as BSD and Lippo Cikarang were much more ambitious. BSD started in the
early 80s from the concept of a large-scale integrated housing estate, while Lippo Cikarang
emerged from the idea of private industrial estate. But in the process of their development,
both of them came to claim themselves to be "kola mandiri" (self-sufficient city) or "kola baru"
(new town), and tried to provide residential areas, work places, shopping facilities, schools, rec-
reational facilities, and all necessary urban infrastructures in a comprehensive and integrated
way so that the whole estate would become a city that was functionally independent from
Jakarta [Teknologi, April 1997: 14]. With this self-sufficiency, it was hoped that these estates
would ease the excessive burden that Jakarta had suffered from its urbanization.
The planning of Kota Legenda also started in about 1986 as a response to the call for large-
scale development by the Minister of People's Housing Affairs, Cosmas Batubara, although real
development of the project started in the 90s. This project has been developed as a commuter
city near Jakarta, and not as a self-sufficient city. But the project of 2,000 ha has also aimed to
make a large-scale estate with a highly comprehensive infrastructure. This project has claimed
to be an especially environmentally-friendly town and attention was paid to factors such as open
spaces, waste disposal and aquifer recharge.
In the three major projects above, we can also find three types of developers. BSD was
developed by a consortium, whose shareholders included representative client entrepreneurs of
Suharto such as Sudono Salim (Salim Group), Sudwikatmono and Eka Tjipta Widjaja (Sinar Mas
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Group). Ciputra orchestrated the consortium to realize the project. In many aspects, this pat-
tern is a continuation of that of Pondok Indah housing estate, and hence represents the first
generation of property-business entrepreneurs in the New Order.
Kota Legenda was developed by the consortium fYf Putra Alvita Pratama (PAP). The con-
sortium consisted of both pribumi and ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs and each shareholder had
an equal stake. But with Moh.S.Hidayat as the chief director, the main actors of the consor-
tium were clearly those of second period under the age of Tim Sepuluh, especially those close
to Siswono Yudohusodo. The members of the consortium called themselves "The Young
Ones." This also reflects their identity as a new generation in the property industry, which is
distinguishable from that of Ciputra's. In short, Kota Legenda was planned to be the symbol of
the success of the second-generation entrepreneurs.
Lippo Cikarang represents a newer tendency. Lippo's Mochtar Riady is a very famous
banker who had long worked with Liem's Salim Group and contributed much to make the
group's BCA (Bank Central Asia) the country's representative private bank. After that, Riady
got his own bank, Bank Lippo, and rapidly expanded its network. Lippo Group became one of
the most famous private businesses in Indonesia, but not as a property business. Although the
group was already engaged in some property business in Hong Kong during the 80s, they were
neither active nor famous in the property sector in Indonesia. When Lippo suddenly started
developing Lippo Cikarang in around 1989, this move surprised many people. The sheer size
of the project looked too ambitious for an inexperienced newcomer. But Lippo made most out
of their experience in the financial field and their credibility.
First, they dispersed risk by involving many foreign investors, like Sumitomo from Japan
and Hyundai from Korea. These foreign partners provided a large part of the capital and the
actual construction work and Lippo itself functioned more as a facilitator for various permits,
land consolidation and marketing.
Secondly, in terms of pre-construction sales, the Lippo group made the most out of their
good name to raise the capital needed for their projects. In the Lippo Karawaci project, an-
other mega new-town, the group started marketing the housing estate long before the actual
construction and succeeded in getting a large amount of overhead capital. Thus the group fur-
ther decreased their dependency on bank credit. These strategies made it possible for the
group to develop mega-projects with a remarkably small credit burden and do so more quickly
than rival projects. Impressed by Lippo's success, many other developers started using this
pre-construction sale, but later on it turned out to be a source of numerous problematic or ficti-
tious projects.
For renewal of the center of Jakarta, several big projects started with the active involve-
ment of the private sector at the end of the 80s, such as the Senen Triangle superblock,
Kemayoran new city, Blok M terminal complex and the Plaza Indonesia.
Superblock is a form of development that integrates residential, business and recreational
functions within a single urban block. Facilities such as condominiums, shopping centers,
hotels and offices are built in a highly integrated way so that people can have almost all of their
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demands met within the complex, thus minimizing the use of cars and therefore reducing traffic
in the urban core. By preventing the urban development that goes on block by block without
any clear orientation, the superblock was expected to heighten the efficiency of urban land-use,
guarantee amenities and prevent traffic jams at the same time.
4. Deregulation and Property Boom
During the mid-80s, private developers were not so active. On one hand, there was a negative
impact from the macro-economic situation resulting from the crash of the oil price and the value
of rupiah. Increasingly tight public expenditure substantially cooled down demand for prop-
erty, while on the other hand, the projects which had started during the oil-boom period contin-
ued to enter the market, thus causing oversupply. The second factor was a financial
shortage. Many entrepreneurs had difficulties in finding financial sources for mega-property
project.
These conditions changed drastically after "Packet October," or the so-called "Pakto" in
1988. This was a pack of drastic deregulation measures that made the banking sector much
more open for newcomers and prompted very rapid growth in the private banking sector.
Many entrepreneurs opened new banks and tried to expand them as fast as possible and thus
stirred the expectation of a coming massive demand for office space. In addition to that, the
liberalization policy succeeded in attracting growing direct foreign investment to Indonesia and
this was concentrated upon the Jabotabek area. This also created new demands for offices,
apartments, golf courses, and shopping centers. On the other hand, newly established banks
fiercely competed in the saving market.
At this point, two doors opened at the same time for private entrepreneurs. Firstly, there
was the opportunity to grasp strategic land in urban area and secondly, there was access to the
capital that was needed for that purpose. Historical experience showed them that the land
price in Jabotabek kept rising and several projections suggested that the demand for land in
Jabotabek would continue to grow in the future. Thus began the age of property boom.
Many entrepreneurs entered this industry, leading to a substantial change in the internal
structure of the industry. In addition to the entry of the Lippo group which I have already
mentioned, there were several important incidents. The first was a construction boom in office
buildings. Many entrepreneurs hastily entered this market to take advantage of the office
demand created by Pakto '88. Especially impressive was the change that occurred in the
so-called "Jakarta Golden Triangle" (Segi Tiga Emas): the land alongside the Thamrin,
Sudirman, Gatut Subroto and Rasuna Said streets, over which many developers fiercely
competed. Many of the developers were owners of banks at the same time. They built high
quality skyscrapers and used them as their banks' headquarters. Many four and five star
hotels were also built in this area.
"Superblock" became a very popular word, and many developers used it to describe their
projects without sharing a clear definition. Senen Triangle Superblock was followed by
Citraland (Mal Ciputra) in Grogol (1993) and then dozens of other projects [PROSPEK, 18 De-
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cember 1993]. (fable 1; Map 1)
The most luxurious among them was the Sudirman Central Business District. This 45 ha
mega project occupies the very heart of the Golden Triangle, and was planned to be the most
comprehensive and the most luxurious superblock in Indonesia. The whole process of the
project will require about 15 years (until year 2007) and about US$3.25 billion. The project has
been developed by Tomy Winata (through PT Danayasa Arthatama), Sugianto Kusuma, the In-
donesian Army (through its foundation: Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi) and two state companies
under the Ministry of Finance (faspen and Danareksa). With support from the Army and the
Ministry of Finance, PT Danayasa Arthatama suddenly emerged as a big developer.
The property boom also made apartments a part of the landscape of Jakarta. This sub sec-
tor began to attract investors' attention as safe and lucrative because they can turn to growing
numbers of expatriates as potential market. Not only was the apartment life style already usual
in their home countries, but good location, excellent and comprehensive facilities and security
Table 1 Planned Superblock Projects in Jakarta during Property Boom (1993)
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15 Citra Golden Triangle
16 Grand Kuningan
17 PSP Super Block
18 Taman Rasuna
19 Kuningan Persada
20 Aero Centre (MBAD)
21 Dwi Tunggal
22 The Atrium
































Danayasa Arthatama, PTI1akarta Int'I Hotel
Adtya Wira Bhakti, Kajima Corp, Yayasan Gelora Senayan



















Pembangunan Jaya, PD/Indokisar Jaya, PT
Indokisar 1aya, PT/Pemb. Sarana 1aya PD/Yayasan PRJ
Sinar Mas Group
Argo Manunggal, PT
1aka Setia Sakti, PT/Indokisar Jaya PT
PT Danamon Land
Source: [PROSPEK, 8 December 1993: 20]
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Map 1 Planned Superblock Projects in Jakarta during the Property Boom Period
were strong magnets for them. Hence when the office market began to be saturated, many
investors rushed to build apartments.
In particular, the entry of the Bakrie Group into the market surprised many people. In the
middle of 1993, Bakrie Investindo suddenly started marketing their apartment Taman Rasuna
through a pre-construction sale system. What was shocking was its very competitive price (Rp.
127-190 million for a middle class unit) and the sheer number of provision (2,500 units in the
first step, and 4,000 units in total). This looked unusually brave and speculative compared with
other projects, which on average sold only 100-300 units. But the response of consumers was
enthusiastic. As many as 1,200 units were sold on the first day of the release and all of its
2,500 units for the initial release were sold out within a week. This was a smash-hit success,
bringing huge profit to Bakrie Investindo while enforcing other investors substantial revision of
their future market prospects.
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Skyscrapers in Sudirman Street
Sudirman Central Business District Apartment Buildings in Lippo Karawaci
aakarta Stock Exchange Building)
Photo 1 The Landscape of Jakarta in Change
(Photographed by the author)
In the housing estate sub-sector, developers competed to seize as much land as possible to
develop large-scale housing estates or self-sufficient cities (Table 2 ; Map 2). Available land
near Jakarta became scarce and developers expanded their project sites to more and more mar-
ginal areas of Botabek.
Developers also rushed to the coast along the Jakarta Bay. Some of the big projects there
included Pantai Indah Kapuk (PIK) , Pantai Modern and Kota Wisata Teluk Naga. Since the
Dharmala Group succeeded in their waterfront housing estate, Pantai Mutiara, this coast area
increasingly attracted developers' attention. Another factor was the skyrocketing land price in
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Table 2 Housing Estates in Botabek ( >500 ha)
No. Name of Project Developer Width (ha) Location
1 Kota Wisata Teluk Naga Grup Salim 8,000 Tangerang
2 Bumi Serpong Damai PT BSD 6,000 Tangerang
3 Citra Raya Grup Ciputra 3,000 Tangerang
4 Kota Tigaraksa PT Panca Wiratama Sakti 3,000 Tangerang
5 Bintaro Jaya PT Jaya Real Praperty 2,321 Tangerang
6 Lippo Karawaci PT Lippoland Development 2,000 Tangerang
7 Gading Serpong PT Jakarta Baru Cosmopolitan 1,500 Tangerang
8 Puri Jaya PT ]aya Real Property 1,745 Tangerang
9 Pantai Indah Kapuk PT Mandara Permai 800 Tangerang
10 Kota Modern PT Modernland Realty 770 Tangerang
11 Alam Sutra PT Alfagold Land 700 Tangerang
12 Kota Legenda PT Putra Alvita 2,000 Bekasi
13 Lippo Cikarang PT Lippoland Development 5,400 Bekasi
14 Cikarang Baru PT Grahabuana Cikarang 1,400 Bekasi
15 Pantai Modern PT Modernland Realty 500 Bekasi
16 Kota Tenjo BHS Land 3,000 Bogor
17 Bukit Sentul PT Royal Sentul Highland 2,000 Bogor
18 Resor Danau Lido PT Pengembangan Wisata Prima 1,700 Bogor
19 Taruma Resor PT Pasir Wangun 1,100 Bogar
20 Citra Indah Grup Ciputra 1,000 Bogor
21 Telaga Kahuripan PT Kuripan Raya 750 Bogor
22 Kota Taman Metropolitan Grup Metropolitan 600 Bogor
23 Rancamaya PT Suryamas Duta Makmur 500 Bogar
24 Kota Wisata IT Duta Pertiwi 1,000 Bogar
Total 50,786
Source: [PROPERT! INDONESIA, April 1997: 24]
Jakarta, which made it relatively more feasible to reclaim coast and to create new land
area. Coastal reclamation also looked less troublesome compared with the difficulties of clear-
ing and consolidating densely populated land.
In the early 90s, several developers had acquired permits for coastal development either
from the Jakarta or the Tangerang government. But later their plans received sharp criticism
as a cause of several social problems (such as floods in the new airport, the destruction of man-
grove forests and prime paddy fields, massive displacement of original residents, etc.). In the
end, President Suharto directly permitted the coast development in 1995 through presidential
decrees. The Kawasan Wisata Terpadu Pantai Kapuknaga (KWTPK) project in Tangerang cov-
ered 8,000 ha, half of it was planned as a residential area and the other half would consist of
marina, hotels, apartments, offices and forest. Salim Group (through its PT Kapuk Naga
Indah) excluded other developers and occupied the dominant position in this project
[PROPERTI INDONESIA, Dec. 1995: 21-29]. The Northern Coast Reclamation Project in
Jakarta was also a mega-project, covering 16,409 ha, 2,700 ha of it being produced with the rec-
lamation of sea, while remaining 13,709 ha would be the redevelopment of existing land. The










followed by Suharto's youngest daughter Siti Hutami Endang (PT Manggala Krida Yudha: 375
ha), laya Group (PT Pembangunan laya Ancol: 290 ha) and the Indonesian Army (PT laladri
Kartika Eka Paksi: 200 ha)[PROPERTI INDONESIA, Nov. 1998: 18-23].
5. Land Speculation and Tight Economic Policy
The series of projects provoked large-scale land speculation, resulting in skyrocketing land
prices. According to Bernard Dorleans, the land price along Rasuna Said street was about
Rp.700,000/m2 in 1988. But in 1989, it jumped to Rp. 1.2 million, Rp. 2.2 million in 1990 and
Rp. 5 million in 1992. Land price alongside Gatot Suberoto street jumped from Rp.900,000/m2
in 1988 to Rp. 3 million in 1989, Rp. 5.5 million in 1990, and Rp. 6 million in 1992 [Dorleans
1994: 51].
The upsurge in land prices had many negative impacts. Growing numbers of people were
displaced while the land price was increasingly out of reach for ordinary people. In addition to
that, many banks were willing to provide credit to property projects without prudent examina-
tion of its use. Thus such credit became a source of risky speculative operations. On the
macro-economic side, the economy became overheated and increased the deficit of balance of
payment. When the Bank of Indonesia started a tight monetary policy in early 1991, many
entrepreneurs who had aggressively expanded their business with too much short-term credit
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immediately got into trouble. Many developers went bankrupt [Rumah Untuk Anda 1995:
42]. After that, bad debt from the property sector burdened the banking sector. In Septem-
ber 1992, total bad debt in the national banking sector was estimated to be Rp. 6.5 trillion or 5%
of total credit of Rp. 121.9 trillion [Siregar et al. 1993: 175].
The most dramatic case was the fall of Bank Summa. In 1988, the year of Pakto '88, this
bank was bought out by Edward Soeryadjaya, a son of the famous owner of Astra International
Group, William Soeryadjaya. Since then, in a very short time this bank has aggressively ex-
panded itself and until the end of 1990 was counted as among the 10 biggest banks in the pri-
vate national bank ranking. Through this bank, Soeryadjaya financed expansion of Summa
Group, particularly to the property sector such as the mega-project Kemayoran New City, the
Surabaya-Madura Bridge project and the hotel business. This expansion was very speculative
in nature and not supported by strong equity bases. In 1990, the bank already had difficulty in
paying back its debt and immediately entered a critical condition due to the tight monetary
policy. To save the bank, Soeryadjaya's father, William took over the handling of the bank's
problem in the end and he had to release all of his shares in Astra International. But his res-
cue operation was already too late. In December 1992, the Bank of Indonesia declared Summa
insolvent and terminated the license of the bank. This incident shocked society and had a
negative impact upon the credibility of the national banking sector [ibid.: Chap. IV].
III Preaching Consumptive Lifestyle
1. Property Boom and the Age 0/ "Lifestyle"
As a result of the property boom, the spatial order of Jabotabek has changed drastically and
through it, there has been a profound impact on its residents. With land prices continuing to
rise, developers tried to exploit the maximum potential profit from every plot of land. Thus in
the early stages, the target market for various projects was always concentrated on the wealthy
upper strata, which was comprised of ruling Indonesian elites (both political and economic) and
expatriates. It was only after this market was regarded as already full, that developers began
to look at the middle strata market while they rarely cared about that of lower strata.
Consequently, the exclusive facilities for upper to middle strata rapidly expanded and increased
in variety, while encroaching upon the lands that had been previously inhabited by middle to
lower strata. Thus emerged new lifestyles combined with special places and facilities. But
the image of these lifestyles spread through mass media and stirred up the desire of wider
population and hence gave birth to various consumptive trends. People of various income level
tried to imitate part of the trends in their own way. Various entrepreneurs tried to make most
out of this dynamism in creating demands for their products.
This also constituted the social context in which the issue of middle class attracted the
attention of Indonesian mass media. The figure of the young executive who uses a cellular
phone, or a group of youths with trendy clothes gathering and chatting in McDonald's... these
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views had often attracted the attention of social observers as a sign of the emergence of a
middle class in Indonesia. As was pointed out by A. Made Tony Supriatma, it was not the level
of consumption, but the mode of consumption that had been noticed as a salient sign of the
emergence of this Indonesian middle class [Supriatma 1997]. Made points out two features of
the mode of consumption of the middle class. Firstly, privatization and secondly, continuously
following what is regarded as the "modern life style."
Made explains the meaning of "privatization" as follows:
Among ordinary people, durable consumer goods have social functions. It is unsocial for some-
body to restrain his neighbors from accessing to such goods. . .. On the contrary, the middle class
family restricts the beneficiaries of such goods only to its family members. Thus the house is sur-
rounded by high walls, its doors are locked, and its windows are barred. [ibid.: 88]
Luxury housing estates provide the hardware most suitable to this privatization. Here,
each nuclear family is separated collectively from wider society. Its neighbors are all on aver-
age of high-income background and the estate as a whole is tightly guarded by security
guards. Developers also fully understood what they are doing. Ciputra once remarked, 'We
do not simply sell housing, but provide a lifestyle (gaya hidup)" [Rumah Untuk Anda 1995:
46]. Lippo Group is another example. In an advertising article for Lippo Karawaci, Reonald
Dng, the Associate Director of Finance and Accounting proudly remarked,
Houses here do not have fences. Our level of confidence is so high because we allow for about
400 security guards, who are always on the alert to secure the safety of the town environment.
[Teknologi, April 1997: 49]
We have high value added, i.e. a different new township environment and life style. [ibid.: 45]
What was corresponding to their business strategy was changing dominant value in the
society; namely that wealth changed from something that has to be hidden to something
that has to be demonstrated in one's "life style" (gaya hiduP) , or more correctly, style of
consumption. Since independence, Indonesia has shown strong populist tradition that is hos-
tile to private profit seeking and resulting private wealth. Even the richest political and eco-
nomic elites cannot neglect this tradition without paying due lip service. But the economic
liberalization policy since the 80s has substantially improved the moral footing of private
business. Mass media came to spotlight successful businessmen not always with suspicious
eyes but also as a trendsetter and the vanguard of national development. And the wealth from
business success became something a bit more legitimate.
But we have to take into account the very wide social gap between the upper and lower
strata. The majority of people in Jabotabek lived with an income of less than Rp. 200,000 each
month. With such a small income, people of lower strata experienced alienation even if wish-
ing to participate in these trends. Jeffery Winter gives a good example. A part-time worker in
McDonald's in Jakarta will have to spend the equivalent of almost four days' wage, if he himself
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wishes to have a lunch of one Big Mac, fried potato and a cup of Coca-Cola [Winter 1999:
14]. If even McDonald's is so expensive for the lower strata, we can easily imagine the dis-
tance between them and the golf boom.
2. Golf Course, Housing Estate and Golf Boom
The golf course was a special symbol of the age of the property boom. It is true that even be-
fore the property boom ]abotabek already had golf courses such as Rawamangun, which was
opened in 1932. Ancol Golf Course and the golf course in Pondok Indah were developed in the
mid-70s. But the property boom since the end of 80s added greater momentum because many
developers made new golf courses as a part of housing estates or resort projects.
Ciputra is one such example. After making the very successful Pondok Indah golf course
in the 70s, he developed golf courses in BSD (Bumi Serpong Damai) and PIK (Pantai Indah
Kapuk), each with an investment of Rp. 100 billion (US$50 million). For developing the course
in BSD, he commissioned Jack Nicklaus with a fee of US$1.2 million so that the course would
be of prime quality in international standards. "If I make a third class golf course, people will
say that my real estate is of third class. But if my golf course is first class, my real estate will
also be regarded as first class." He said in a interview with PROSPEK magazine [PROSPEK,
Feb. 1992: 75].
Ciputra admitted that the investment in the golf courses itself, if thought separately from
the whole estate, was not at all a profitable venture. But the skyrocketing price of golf-club
memberships became a strong incentive for many other developers to make an entry to this
sector. According to PROPERTI INDONESIA magazine, an investor can feel safe if he can sell
just 500 active memberships in his course and if its membership exceeds 1,000, the initial in-
vestment will be paid off within three years [PROPERTI INDONESIA, Oct. 1998: 35]. Thus it
is not surprising if many developers of housing estates or "self-sufficient cities" rushed to
develop golf courses. Developers also made golf courses as a part of resort facilities, for
example in Gunung Geulis Country Club (in Bogor, PT Multi Dipta ]aya, Mulyadi Budiman),
Resor Danau Lido (in Sukabumi, PT Pemgembangan Agrowisata Prima, Keluarga Ibnu Sutowo)
and so on. Before the economic crisis, the number of golf courses around Jabotabek reached
about 30 (Table 3).
Memberships of golf courses had been bought at Rp. 100 million or higher. Such high
prices were supported by the standing of golf as a medium of lobbying and as an object of in-
vestment within the business circle. It was this close tie with business that made golf a repre-
sentative and very prestigious sport in the age of economic liberalization. President Suharto
himself played golf one to three times a week in Rawamangun Golf Course. So did famous
businessmen and ministers and other high-ranking officials [PROSPEK, Feb. 1992]. Renowned
businessmen such as Bob Hassan, Sudwikatmono, Ciputra, and Aburizal Bakrie were also
known as golf lovers. Beginning from the top of the political and economic hierarchy, the golf
boom rapidly spread among the wealthy upper to middle classes living in Jabotabek. Many
companies were willing to pay so that their executives became members of one or even several
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Damai Indah Golf & C.C.
a. Bumi Serpong Damai Course
b. Pantai Indah Kapuk Course
Emeralda Golf & C.C.
Gunung Geulis c.c.
RaHm G.C. I & II
Imperial Klub Golf
Jagorawi Golf & C.c.
Jaya Ancol G.C.
Karawang International G.c.
Kedaton Golf & Coc.
Padang Golf Cikampek
Padang Golf Modern
Padang Golf Pangkalan Jati
Palm Hill C.C.
Permata Sentul Golf & C.Co
Pondok Indah Golf & c.c.
Pondok Cabe Golf
Bukit Pelangi Golf & C.Co
Rancamaya Golf & C.c.
Jakarta G.c. (Rawamangun)
Riverside GoC.












Source: Uakarta Mini Guide 1998]
Cibarusa, Cikarang Barn, Bekasi
Kompleks R.S. Fatmawati, Cilandak
Serpong, Tangerang
J1. Marina Indah Penjaringan Kapuk
Desa Topos, Kec. Cimanggis
Pasir Angin Gadog Bogor
J1. Skwadron, RaHm Perdana Kusma
J1. Pulau Golf, Lippo Karawaci
J1. Desa Kranggan, Cibinong
Taman Impian Jaya Ancol
J1. Bukit Golf Indah
11. Pengernihan I
J1. Raya Dawuan, Cikampek Karawang
Perumahan Modern Land, Cipondoh, Tangerang
J1. Jati Raya, Pondok Labu
Sentul, Desa Kadumanggu, Kec. Citeureup, Dati II Bogor
Desa Tangkil, Kecamatan Citereup, Keb. Bogor
J1. Metro Pondok Indah
J1. Cabe Raya, Ciputat, Tangerang
Pasir Angin, Ciawi, Bogor
J1. Raya Sukabumi, Ciawi Bogor
J1. Rawamangun Muka Raya, Jakarta Timur
Desa Bojong Nangka, Gunung Putri
J1. Bulever Gading Golf, Serpong, Tangerang
J1. Raya Sawangan Parung Bogor
ditto
J1. Tal Jakarta Cikampek
J1. Asia Afrika Senayang
Kota Tigaraksa, Desa Cikupa
J1. MR. Kaft I Ciganjur, Jakarta Selatan
Golf Estate Bogor Raya, Bogor
J1. Raya Bogor-Sukabumi
Bukit Sentul, Sentul, Bogor
J1. Dr. Semeru Bogor
golf courses, putting their hope in the lobbying power of golf. Young managers also tried to
follow the trend hoping to make better personal relationships with superiors that would help
with their promotion. Many companies also used golf tournaments as prestigious ways of pro-
motion [ibid.: 70].
The houses surrounding golf courses in luxurious housing estates became representative
status symbols. Pondok Indah housing estate was the pioneer of such a "golf view" style and
was followed by many other projects. According to the book Para Superkaya Indonesia (the
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HUNIAN EKSKLUSIF 01 TENGAH PERBUKITAN
ff·· .. ')' .... /':efi,ng dengankemaJuan zaman. peng.hargaan orang terhadap .llngk.ungan akan/ k semakln tlnggl. Permata Sentul dlbangun dengan konsep hunlan berwawasan-~,,~... lingkungan. Udaranya nyaman. Ilngkungannya aman. dan fasllitasnya
disesuaikan dengan gaya hidup masyarakat modern. Hanya 1.000 kepala
keluarga yang dipilih menghuni perumahan mewah seluas 600 hektar ini.
Photo 2 "Golf View" Has Become a Symbol of Success
(An Advertisement of Permata Sentul Housing Estate)
Indonesian Super Rich), other elite residential areas included "Bukit Vila Kelapa Gading,
Permata Hijau, Simprug, Widya Candra and Grand Kuningan. You can safely assure that those
who live in the areas above are in the upper class" [Wardhana & Barns 1998: 58]. These kinds
of housing estates are very luxurious, well-ordered, clean, calm, exclusive, firmly guarded by
security guards and have sports facilities such as golf courses, athletic gyms, tennis courts,
swimming pools and so on. Several housing estates and "new towns" are equipped with presti-
gious private schools and modern hospitals.
During the property boom, a growing number of people tried to buy houses in such luxury
housing estates, both for settlement and investment or speculative purposes. Because of
the sharp rise in the housing price in Jabotabek, many consumers hurriedly purchased.
Developers were also very clever in provoking speculative demand from the upper class. They
used various marketing gimmicks, trying to impress with the potential capital gain in the
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future. This tendency was more conspicuous among newcomers in this business, probably to
offset their lack of experience. Not to miss the chance of a good purchase, many customers
were willing to layout hefty down payments before the beginning of the construction work on
the projects for which they paid. Trijono Gondokusmo, a young entrepreneur who directed the
PSP group, explained as follows:
Pre-construction sales are also a good thing as consumers both finance part of construction as
well as the fact that the products that will be built already have buyers. Various marketing gimmicks
must also be interesting and easy to be remembered so that they spread by word of mouth. The
more people buy a product, the quicker other consumers decide to follow. People come to fear miss-
ing their share of the opportunities. [Top Tokoh Properti Indonesia & Karya-Karyanya 1997: 144]
3. Malls, Fast Food Chains and Movie Theaters
In 1990, Plaza Indonesia was opened by PT Plaza Indonesia Realty in the center of Central
Jakarta. Its main shareholder was PT Bimantara Citra, which was owned by Bambang
Trihatmodjo, Suharto's second son. This plaza looked very different from previous shopping
centers, not only because of its exceptionally luxurious interior design, but also by having spe-
cial anchor tenants; Sogo (one of the famous department stores of Japan) and the hotel, Grand
Hyatt. Previous shopping centers did not use an anchor tenant system but rather a kind of
collection of various small retail shops.
Sogo's entry provoked some controversy because at that time laws prohibited foreign capi-
tal to enter the retail sector. Mer some protest, direct investment entry was abandoned and
instead replaced by technical assistance and logo-use contracts. But this was a rather cosmetic
modification and anyway Sogo was opened. Sogo's entry gave rise to a new awareness among
domestic retail circles that the retail business was no longer protected from the power of mam-
moth foreign capital and hence they had to get ready to compete with it. This sense of crisis
was further enhanced because Sogo's domestic counterpart, Rajawali Wira Bhakti Utama, whose
majority share was held by Sjamsul Nursalim, also linked with Metro from Singapore and
opened Metro Pondok Indah in 1991. Besides, another famous Japanese retailer, Yaohan, also
entered in August 1990, as an anchor tenant of Atrium Senen (Ongko Group). Thus, the entry
of Sogo, Metro and Yaohan opened the door to the age of great competition to dominate the
upper-class retail market. To stand against such foreign capital, domestic companies such as
Matahari and Pasaraya upgraded their shops and tried to raise their brand image. It was also
in 1990 that the first private TV channel was opened by the President's family business and
started TV commercials. These changes heated the consumptive atmosphere greatly and that
in turn prompted the expansion of supermarkets such as HERO and Golden Truly, often in
shopping malls. The number of shopping centers itself was drastically increasing from
1990. In 1991, Mal Pondok Indah (Group Pondok Indah: Ciputra and others) started its
operation. This shopping center became very popular with its sophisticated but friendly
atmosphere. Both Plaza Indonesia and Mal Pondok Indah targeted the upper class as their
market. Ciputra Group immediately followed their move with the opening of Mal Ciputra
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(1993) in Grogol, West Jakarta, which targeted a market segment slightly lower than that of the
Plaza Indonesia or Mal Pondok Indah. This mall also became a very successful popular shop-
ping center. In following years, people in Jabotabek witnessed more and more new shopping
Table 4 The Growth of Shopping Centers in Jabotabek
No. Shopping Center Year Width (m2) Developer
1 Sarinah 1965 21,000 PT Sarinah (BUMN)
2 Duta Merlin 1979 13,000
3 Aldiron Plaza 1980 13,800
4 Pasaraya Youg & Trendy 1980 13,800 A. Latif Corp
5 Ratu Plaza 1981 22,500 Grup Ratu Sayang
6 Gajah Mada Plaza 1982 54,000 Grup Harapan
7 Melawai Plaza 1984 10,000
8 Metro Ps. Baru 1985 16,000
9 Harco Ps. Baru 1986 20,000
10 Glodok Plaza 1987 42,500 Intra Maju Jaya
11 Plaza Barito 1988 10,000
12 King's Plaza 1988 20,000
13 Pasaraya Blok M 1989 42,000 A. Latif Corp
14 Plaza Indonesia 1990 60,000 Gajah Tunggal
Bimantara, Sinar Mas
15 Metro Atom 1991 20,000
16 Golden Truly 1991 20,000 Grup Golden Truly
17 ITC Mangga Dua 1991 68,000 Grup Sinar Mas
18 Pasar Pagi Mangga Dua 1991 60,000 Grup Napan
19 Pondok Indah Mall 1991 40,000 Metropolitan Kencana
20 Blok M Plaza 1991 53,000 Pakuwon Jati
21 Atrium Senen 1992 32,550 Grup Ongko
22 Mal Blok M 1993 12,000 Grup Ometraco
23 Citraland Mall 1993 70,000 Grup Ciputra
24 Metropolitan Mall 1993 50,000 Grup Metropolitan
25 Plaza Bintaro Jaya 1993 31,000 Grup Jaya
26 Mal Kelapa Gading 1994 25,000 Summarecon
27 Mal Lippo Cikarang 1995 30,000 Grup Lippo
28 ITC Roxy Mas 1995 30,000 Grup Sinar Mas
29 Harco Mangga Dua 1995 32,000
30 Mega Pasaraya (Seibu) 1995 25,000 A. Latif Corp
31 Super Mall (Lippa Village) 1995 210,000 Grup Lippo
32 Senayan Square 1995 80,000 Era Persada
33 Mal Taman Anggrek 1996 132,000 Grup Mulia & Maharani
34 Mal Puri Indah 1996 60,000 Grup Metropolitan
35 Mega Mal 1996 142,000 PT Indoglobal Land
36 Mal Mangga Dua 1996 45,000 Grup Sianr Mas
37 Mega ITC Cempaka 1997 60,000 Grup Sinar Mas
38 Mal Ambasador I 1997 15,000 Grup Sinar Mas
Source: [Susanto 1998] etc.
Note: The purpose of this table is to show the tendency of increasing numbers of shopping
centers in and around Jakarta, and thus not to show complete list of shopping centers in
Jabotabek.
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centers opening in various places. Their locations were now not confined to Jakarta but had
spread to the suburb area of Botabek. In general, shopping centers in the 90s were called
"mal" (Table 4; Map 3).
Besides having anchor tenants, shopping centers in the 90s had several features in com-
mon [Direktori Apartmen, Perkantoran & Pusat Perbelanjaan 1996: 56].
1) Interesting building design: Many mal try to distinguish themselves with attractive de-
signs and colors. For example, Plaza Indonesia has a beautiful design that gives an impression
of calm and elegance. Mal Ciputra is very colorful with many signboards on the pink and
white wall (see Photo 3).
2) A well designed circulation system for visitors and interior structure: Several mal such
as Mal Ciputra and Atrium Senen adopted the idea of a single corridor from the latest USA and
European shopping malls. A single corridor makes it possible (or makes it possible to en-
force?) for visitors to pass by all the shops in a floor. Other features were wide-open atria and
wide corridors, and high open ceilings which maximize natural lighting. As a result of all
these, the shopping center is now no longer just a collection of shops, but closer to a kind of
theme park of commodity.
3) One stop shopping: Malls were designed to have comprehensive shopping and recre-
ational facilities so that every customer of any age can meet every need in one visit. Based on
this concept, most malls were equipped with food courts and sometimes with movie
Map 3 The Growth of Shopping Centers in ]abotabek
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Mal Ciputra: Mal in the 90s are featured with
their interesting design.
Source: [Indonesia Property Report, Volume I No.3,
1996: 33]
The first outlet of McDonald's and Hard Rock
Cafe in Sarinah Department
(Photographed by the author)
Photo 3 Mal, Kale and Fast Food Restaurant
theaters. Several malls went further. Mal Taman Anggrek has an indoor ice-skating rink and
Lippo Super Mal has an indoor amusement park including a jet coaster.
In line with this development, fast food chains, mostly from abroad, gained a momentum of
expansion with the franchising system. Fast food chains themselves were not something new
even before the mal boom. For example, Kentucky Fried Chicken made a pioneer entry in
1979 by opening its first outlet in J1. Melawai, Jakarta [PROPERTI INDONESIA, April 1997:
46]. But the expansion of fast food chain was enormously accelerated by the property boom
and by the mal boom in particular. Amir Karamoy, a consultant of franchising business ex-
plained this point.
The development of franchising is really in line with the growth of the property
business. Business actors in franchising need strategic locations to market their products. On the
other hand property developers need the presence of good brand-name products to give value added
to their property. They hence give value added to each other. The presence of McDonald's in BSD
and Mal Pondok Indah for example, is clearly an effort to give value added to the location of the real
estates concerned. [ibid.: 56]
As is mentioned above, McDonald's is a representative example of the fast food chains
which had rapidly expanded during the mal boom period. Its introduction to Jakarta was done
by those who had strong connections with the political elite, Le. Bambang N. Racmadi, a son-in-
law of ex-State Secretariat, Soedarmono [ibid. : 42]. The first outlet was opened in the Sarinah
Department Store in J1. Thamrin, Central Jakarta in 1991. This outlet became a strong magnet
for Sarinah, as was admitted by Bambang N. Rachmadi. "Before, this building was quite de-
serted, but it became very crowded once we made the entry" [ibid. : 46]. After this first outlet,
McDonald's opened outlets in almost every new mal in ]abotabek. The many potential con-
sumers which mal can attract, and cheaper investment costs were two of the factors behind this
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mal-centered expansion strategy.
The movie theater industry was also profoundly affected by the mal boom. Mal became a
strategic location for theater because of its ability to attract many potential viewers. Malls also
much needed theaters as one of their important anchor tenants. The business chance which
the mal boom created was almost exclusively exploited by the Subentara Group through its the-
ater chain, Studio 21. This group was owned by Sudwikatmono and held a monopoly of im-
porting foreign films. The group made the most out of this upstream monopoly to take over
hundreds of theaters. According to Rosita Noer, the owners of theaters who were not willing
to join Studio 21 were almost without exception made to wait long to get foreign films or were
only provided with second-class films [Noer 1998: 65]. Theaters under the Studio 21 chain are
averagely clean, comfortable, expensive and strongly oriented to Hollywood movies. With the
mal boom and beginning of private TV channels, the Indonesian film industry was drastically
ruined in the 90s.
All of the above transformations have changed the meaning of shopping. Mal not only
provide commodities, but also a show and a stage: a show because shopping itself (not pur-
chased commodities or services) has become a form of leisure, and a stage because visitors go
to mal not only to watch something but also to be watched and to attract attention. Many
young girls and boys come to visit mal wearing clothes as trendy as possible. It is also in mal
that many of them try to find friends of the opposite sex, behavior known as "ngeceng."
4. The Kale Boom
The age of the property boom was also an age of kale, the Indonesian counterparts to
cafes. Like many other contemporary trends from the West, its style generally looks influ-
enced by the American cafe and it is usually accompanied by live music shows. Kale started as
a prestigious place of social intercourse for the upper class. According to SWA magazine, the
custom of gathering and socializing in kale was first brought by expatriates and was spread by
executives who had lived abroad, especially in America or Europe. "In a short time, this life
style also spread and became a symbol of the modern and elite life style. Not a small number
of young poorer executives and ABG (Anak Baru Gede) , alias teenage kids, go to kale to be
seen as modern and elite" [SWA, 02/XIV/22 Jan.-4 Feb.1998 : 54].
The kale boom started when News Cafe was opened in J1. Kuningan in 1991. In a very
short time, the number of kale rapidly increased and in 1998, SWA magazine counted as many
as 105 kale in DKI Jakarta. Kale became quite a big industry with a huge turnover. If added
to non-fast-food restaurants, which are often called "resto," SWA estimated that about Rp. 6 tril-
lion had been invested in this sector in Jakarta up to that time [ibid. : 30]. Each kale tried to be
distinctive "with a relaxing atmosphere mixed with certain theme - in its choice of interior de-
sign, menu of food and drink, or music" [loco cit]. (fable 5)
The places that were often passed by young professionals became strategic locations for
kale business, such as J1. Thamrin, J1. Sudirman, J1. Kuningan and Blok M. Also included were
Kemang, Bangka and Ampera, which are located along traffic courses between elite residential
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Table 5 Cafe in Jakarta
No. Name of Cafe Location No. Name of Cafe Location
1 Kafe Victoria Central Jakarta 48 Paledang Giosis Cafe North Jakarta
2 B. A. T. S Central Jakarta 49 Pangerang Cafe North Jakarta
3 Bumbu Indonesia Kafe Central Jakarta 50 Piza Cafe North Jakarta
4 Cafe California Central Jakarta 51 Sidewalk Cafe North Jakarta
5 Cafe Marco Central Jakarta 52 Kafe Batavia West Jakarta
6 Elvi's Cafe Central Jakarta 53 Kafe St-Resto West Jakarta
7 Exce1co Cafe Central Jakarta 54 Amigos South Jakarta
8 Garden Lounge Central Jakarta 55 Asmat-asmat South Jakarta
9 Garden Terrace Central Jakarta 56 B & B South Jakarta
10 Grand Cafe Central Jakarta 57 Balemang South Jakarta
11 Hard Rock Cafe Central Jakarta 58 Bairn Cafe South Jakarta
12 Jazz'N Rock Cafe Central Jakarta 59 Cafe Betawi South Jakarta
13 Jumpa Central Jakarta 60 Cafe de Paris South Jakarta
14 Kafe Alyadrus Central Jakarta 61 Cafe Grantia South Jakarta
15 Kafe Beranda Central Jakarta 62 Castero Do Mar South Jakarta
16 Kafe Bon Vivant Central Jakarta 63 Champion South Jakarta
17 Kafe Fashion Central Jakarta 64 Classic Rock Stage South Jakarta
18 Kafe Hagen Dazs Central Jakarta 65 Club Bayou South Jakarta
19 Kafe Indonesia Central Jakarta 66 Dome Boutique Cafe South Jakarta
20 Kafe Oh La La Central Jakarta 67 Expresso South Jakarta
21 Kafe Teh Tarik Mat Dollah Central Jakarta 68 Hollywood Cafe South Jakarta
22 Kafe Venezia Central Jakarta 69 J & J South Jakarta
23 Kafe Wien Central Jakarta 70 Jalan-jalan South Jakarta
24 Lagoon Cafe Central Jakarta 71 JAMZ South Jakarta
25 Le Cafe Central Jakarta 72 Jimbani South Jakarta
26 Lobby Lounge Central Jakarta 73 Kafe Capri South Jakarta
27 Mal Kafe Central Jakarta 74 Kafe Coterie South Jakarta
28 Nirwana Super Club Central Jakarta 75 Kafe Indiana South Jakarta
29 Pairing Kafe Central Jakarta 76 Kafe Padusi South Jakarta
30 Peacock Cafe Central Jakarta 77 Kafe Prambors South Jakarta
31 Planet Hollywood Central Jakarta 78 Kafe Regal South Jakarta
32 Prambanan Cafe Central Jakarta 79 Kafe Restoran South Jakarta
33 Ribbons Cafe Central Jakarta 80 Kafe Tebet South Jakarta
34 Scoop Cafe Central Jakarta 81 Kafe Top M South Jakarta
35 Seasons Cafe Central Jakarta 82 Kafe Toraja South Jakarta
36 Semanggi Lounge Central Jakarta 83 Kemang 31 South Jakarta
37 Senayan Cafe Central Jakarta 84 La X'press Cafe South Jakarta
38 Sky Garden Central Jakarta 85 M Club South Jakarta
39 Teratai Cafe Central Jakarta 86 Mall Cafe South Jakarta
40 Bambu Kafe North Jakarta 87 News Cafe South Jakarta
41 Betawi Kafe North Jakarta 88 Pasir Putih South Jakarta
42 Cafe Janur Mayang Sari North Jakarta 89 Tifa Grill & Cafe South Jakarta
43 Equinox North Jakarta 90 Twilite Cafe South Jakarta
44 Kafe Gendy's North Jakarta 91 Zanzibar South Jakarta
45 Kafe Nevi's North Jakarta 92 Kafe Bambu Betawi East Jakarta
46 Kakatua North Jakarta 93 Kafe Kolibri East Jakarta
47 Le Bistro North Jakarta
Source: lSWA, 02/XIV/22 Jan.-4 Feb. 1998: 42)
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areas of southern Jakarta and the city business core. In particular, Kemang had been the
center of the kale boom. This area is a residential area for upper elites and expatriates.
According to PROPERTI INDONESIA magazine, about 20,000 foreigners live in this area
[PROPERTI INDONESIA, May 1997: 38].
Bambang Wiyogo, a son of ex-Governor DKI Jakarta Wiyogo Atmodarminto was an ex-
ample of the entrepreneurs who succeeded well in the kale business. Starting from Kafe
]imbani in Kemang, he opened several kale such as Balembang, JJ Duit, Jalan-Jaln, Asmat,
B-One and Empire Grill [PROPERTI INDONESIA, April 1997: 43]. Martina Melsiwati, the
eldest daughter of Sudwikatmono, invested Rp. 16 billion when she opened a branch of the
mammoth Planet Hollywood in 1994 in J1. Gatot Subroto, Jakarta [INFO BISNIS 54 TH III, Jan. -
Feb. 1998: 18]. Besides, the Taman Ria Senayan amusement park which opened in 1998 in-
vited many big kale in quite a large part of the park, hence it became something like a "kale
park."
Kale had been demanded as a place of social intercourse for the people of upper to middle
strata. Tonie Kodili, General Manager of Cafe Jimbaran (sic) explained this point in TIARA
magazine.
Visitors to kale desire to look and be seen by other visitors, so that they are not called
unsociable. It is these factors that were seized upon by entrepreneurs as a business chance. [TIARA,
1 April 1998: 82]
This social intercourse also included business lobbying and the exchange of business
information. Kale also became a place for various functions such as Halloween and Birthday
parties for elite circles [Wardhana & Barns 1998: 38].
5. Resort Development
The property boom also created massive investment in facilities for tourism, resorts and other
recreations. It is worth noticing that the Indonesian government has paid due effort to devel-
oping the tourism industry as one of the main sources of foreign exchange after the crash of the
oil price. Several salient efforts are among others, Kampanye Nasional Sadar Wisata (National
Campaign for Touristic Consciousness)(1989), Law No.9 year 1990 about tourism, Visit Indone-
sia Year (1991) and Visit ASEAN Year (1992).
Indeed, the growth of foreign tourists was impressive and the contribution of tourism to
national foreign exchange revenue steadily increased from the lowest of the ranking to fourth in
1993 with US$ 3,640.8 million [Musanef 1996: 5]. The government has also promoted tourism
among Indonesians themselves, and they are called wisnus (wisatawan nusantara). Moreover,
the presence of foreign tourists itself provoked the growth of wisnus. For example, Kuta and
Legian area in Bali became a trendy place for the young generation of Jabotabek because of its
unique atmosphere that emerged with foreign tourists.
These conditions made a very good investment environment for private entrepreneurs.
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While older destinations such as the Ancol amusement park and Taman Mini Indonesia Indah
renewed their facilities, developers in Jabotabek more and more expanded their scope of invest-
ment place. One good example is the Puncak area (Map 4). It is true that this mountainous
area had long been famous for its cool climate and beautiful landscape. Before, political and
economic elites built villas individually for holiday stays. Later, developers started building and
marketing villas in a more organized manner. The Modern Group for example, started their
entry into the property business after developing villas in Puncak [Top Tokoh Properti Indonesia
& Karya-Karyanya 1997: 50]. Since the end of the 80s, the increase of visitors and facilities in
Puncak supported and strengthened each other. Various villas, hotels and diskotik were built
alongside the route from Ciawi, Cipayung, Cisarua, to Puncak Pass and even extended to other
areas of Bogor and Cianjur outside of Puncak. Travelling to Puncak became so popular that in
weekends and holidays, traffic jams reached several kilometers, causing air and noise pollu-
tion.
Because available land in the Puncak area was so limited, developers started looking for
alternative places to develop large-scale comprehensive resorts. One example is Risor Danau
Lido (Lido Lake Resort; PT Pengembangan Agrowisata Prima, owned by the family of Ibnu
Sutowo). Also included were resorts in Carita Beach and Anyer Beach area in Kabupaten
Serang. (Among others, Resor Marbela by PT Pudjiadi Prestige, Marina Anyer by Daksa
Group, and Resor & Vila Tropika Anyer by PT Artakurnia Pragola) [Direktori Realestat Indone-
sia 1997: 37]. The latest and biggest investment plan was for the 8,000 ha Teluk Naga project
in Tangerang (Salim Group). The success of resort developments in Carita and Anyer Beach
made more and more people in Jabotabek familiar with beach holidays. In 1995, the office of
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Bupati Serang counted as many as 3,803,588 tourists visiting the region, and most of them
(3,754,203) were wisnus (Indonesian tourist) [loco cit.].
IV The End of the Feast
1 . Oversupply and Crash
Because many entrepreneurs rushed into the property business, supply rapidly outstripped
demand. As the price of apartments and houses skyrocketed, their products were too expen-
sive for the majority of population in ]abotabek. Consequently, developers had to compete for
the remaining demand from the upper class. Much of this demand was sheer speculation,
barely supported by the prospect of continuing rising prices.
Oversupply in the office building sector occurred most early. The construction boom that
was triggered by Pakto '88 gave birth to massive supply in the early 90s. But the demand for
offices declined sharply because of the tight monetary policy in 1991, causing heavy loss on
many projects which were based on optimistic market projections (Fig. 1).
The apartment subsector reached its peak in 1992-93. After this period, oversupply in-
creasingly haunted this subsector and became really severe after 1995. Developers had to
lower the price. The average price per square meter was US$2,128 in 1993, but fell to US$
1,492 in 1997 [PROPERTI INDONESIA, June 1997: 18]. Many developers suffered big loss re-
sulting from a lack of buyers or tenants (Fig. 2).
The housing estate subsector also showed signs of oversupply from around 1995. The
land price which had consistently risen in the Jabotabek housing market, finally stopped
rising. Developers refused to lower the nominal price of their products, but instead had to pro-
vide every kind of additional service to keep their products viable on the market. Those who
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Fig. 2 Supply and Demand for Apartments in Jabotabek 1993-98
Source: [Direktori Apartmen, Perkantoran & Pusat Perbelanjaan 1996]
the outskirts of Botabek suffered most.
Because most developers relied heavily on bank credit, the effect of oversupply increas-
ingly put pressure upon banks. Bankers tried to buy time by covering up non-performing loan;
for example by dividing stopped interest payment into many parts, and enrolling them as new
credits to other affiliated corporations. But these efforts only worsened the condition of the
banks. Many hoped that the oversupply was temporary and that the market condition would
soon improve again. But the monetary crisis in 1997 crushed such hopes.
In 1997 after the crash of the property market in Thailand, the Bank of Indonesia finally
took very firm measures by issuing a decision letter on 7 July (SK tg1.7 Juli). This letter pro-
hibited banks from giving new credit for land purchase or land improvement except for that of
low-cost housing (RS and RSS) projects. The letter also prohibited counting land as a part of
collateral for new loans. Banks were also prohibited from guaranteeing obligations issued for
land purchase or land improvement purposes [PROPERTI INDONESIA, Aug. 1997: 18]. This
was a stern action indeed, but obviously too late. Indonesian property sector had already be-
come too overgrown and the banking sector had exposed itself too deeply to the growth. Both
of these sectors had already become very fragile, and hence easily collapsed in front of the cur-
rency turmoil.
The property boom left a financial mess. According to PROPERTI INDONESIA, of the
total credit of national banking sector, which amounted to Rp. 400 trillion, about 20% or Rp. 80
trillion was flowed into the property sector and about 28 trillion of it became non-performing
loans [PROPERTI INDONESIA, May 1988: 18]. The rehabilitation of the banking sector is
estimated to require US$87 billion, and this figure amounts to 82% of the Indonesian
GDP. Based upon these figures, Standard and Poor's (S & P) conclude that the banking crisis
of Indonesia was the worst banking crisis in world history since the 70s [The Jakarta Post, 11
June 1999: 1]. Such a huge cost will heavily burden coming generations of Indonesian
people.
In the property sector itself, members of REI (Real Estate Indonesia) which had reached
2,400 in 1997, dropped to 1,400 one year later [KOMPAS, 24 Nov. 1998: 2]. Many projects
have been stopped, and many consumers who had already laid out down-payments to develop-
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ers have not yet received the promised products.
The ruin of the national economy destroyed the last source of legitimacy of the New Order,
namely the achievement of economic development.
2. Alienation and Resentment
While dominant social value became increasingly consumptive within the upper social strata,
the people of the lower strata were growing alienated from such tendencies. But it was these
people that formed the majority of residents in Jabotabek. To secure support from these
people, the changes had to be accompanied by a more institutionalized redistribution
system. But efforts in such a direction were completely sidestepped by the enormous tides of
consumptive trends for wealthy people. Thus it is not surprising that the people of lower strata
tried to constitute a counter culture. What was desired in the counter culture was a sense of
participation, sharing and modesty. And since the end of the 80s, the figure of Sukarno-
Megawati increasingly became a salient symbol of this counter culture. People's resentment
also finds its shape in a religious righteousness. Racism and hostility toward ethnic Chinese
and Christian minority was also widely and deeply ingrained. Widespread riots in May 1998 in
the Jabotabek area testified to the fact that the rapid development of Jabotabek in the property
boom period had hidden fatal socio-economic problems. Although I am convinced that this riot
was not spontaneous but meticulously engineered, we cannot deny that many urban residents
cheerfully joined the looting, burning and violence as if it was a big festival. This itself testifies
to the depth of the accumulated problems of this city and especially the depth of the alienation
of the urban lower mass from the previous urban-developmental process.
V Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we retrospect the profound social change that had taken place in Indonesia's met-
ropolitan area during the past decade in terms of various new urban facilities and their supply-
side context. This makes it possible to spotlight one of the most dynamic aspect of Indonesian
society at that time. We see that past change was closely contingent upon property
boom. The boom stood on very fragile and unsustainable ground. Since the economic crisis
in 1997, everything has changed so drastically and now we are tempted to brush away the past
boom period as something like an illusion that is totally irrelevant to contemporary situation in
Indonesia. But we have yet to confirm the depth of its long-term impacts. Various mal, sky-
scrapers, kale and new housing estates had not just gone with the frenzy property boom,
although their ownerships may now move to different hands. These facilities have firmly es-
tablished themselves as a part of contemporary urban life in the region. The charm of con-
sumptive lifestyle which these facilities have brought with still do not lose its power in the
people's mind and can thrive again after economic recovery.
Likewise, we cannot just brush away middle-class phenomena as an Ersatz middle-
class. On one hand, to the degree that what was called middle class depended on past prop-
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erty boom, it was indeed as fragile as the property boom itself. In the political sphere, the role
of many intellectuals and most of all, that of students in the process of democratization since
1997 is no doubt marvelous. But we have yet to see whether it is much meaningful to discuss
their role in terms of the middle class. But on the other hand, it is not so meaningful for out-
side observers to evaluate whether what is called Indonesian "kelas menengah" (middle class) is
similar to the idealized image of Western middle class as a driving force of democracy.
We can distinguish between the middle class that was made visible by consumptive trends
and the middle class as a discursive practice in the Indonesian public sphere. As was analyzed
by Ariel Heryanto, the Indonesian middle class was almost always referred as "they," not "we"
or "I," although the producers of such discourses in fact should also be categorized as a very
part of what they talk about. They lamented the absence of "true" middle class as a driving
force of democratization. But with using "they," those who lamented on the Ersatz middle
class was able to distance himself from sharing the responsibility on such "deviation" from
"true" middle class [Heryanto 1990]. Middle class as discursive practice thus had its own spe-
cific function in the New Order's repressive public sphere. Now, after the fall of the New Or-
der and in much more democratic environment, the discourse of middle class would not be
same as that of the New Order period.
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